This book examines the interaction between state security and regime security in South Korea in the period 1953-60 under the leadership of President Syngman Rhee. The author shows that the 'march North' was a manifestation of Rhee's concern for both state and regime security and that Rhee's aggressive anti-Communist policy contributed to the promotion of security in South Korea. As he declined in popularity, however, Rhee's concern for the survival of the regime increased and he used the prevailing anti-Communist feeling to enhance his legitimacy. However, his tactics could ensure neither regime security nor the security of South Korea.
CONTENIDO: List of Tables - Preface - Acknowledgements -List of Abbreviations - A Note on Romanization - Introduction - Historical Setting: the Division of Korea, the Korean War, and the Evolution of Syngman Rhee's Anti-Communist Policy - The Ending of the Korean War and Syngman Rhee's Search for a U.S.-R.O.K. Mutual Defence Treaty, April - August 1953 - The Post-Armistice Security Policy of Syngman: The Strengthening of R.O.K. Forces, September 1953 - November 1954 - Internal and External Challenges to the Rhee Regime and Rhee's Growing Concern for Regime Security, November 1954 - May 1956 - The Primacy of Regime Security and the Vulnerability of State Security, May 1956 - November 1958 - The Domestic Use of State Security and the Collapse of the Rhee Regime, December 1958 - April 1960 - Conclusion: the Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea - Bibliography - Index
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